Administrative Law—Collateral Estoppel—Adverse Findings on Issues in Negligence Action Do Not Preclude Plaintiff from Relitigating Identical Issues in Subsequent Longshoreman’s and Harbor Workers\u27 Act Proceeding. by Manch, David E.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 18 




Administrative Law—Collateral Estoppel—Adverse Findings on 
Issues in Negligence Action Do Not Preclude Plaintiff from 
Relitigating Identical Issues in Subsequent Longshoreman’s and 
Harbor Workers' Act Proceeding. 
David E. Manch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David E. Manch, Administrative Law—Collateral Estoppel—Adverse Findings on Issues in Negligence 
Action Do Not Preclude Plaintiff from Relitigating Identical Issues in Subsequent Longshoreman’s and 
Harbor Workers' Act Proceeding., 18 Buff. L. Rev. 321 (1969). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol18/iss2/9 
This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-ADVERSE FINDINGS
ON ISSUES IN NEGLIGENCE ACTION Do NOT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF ]FROM RE-
LITIGATING IDENTICAL IsSUES IN SUBSEQUENT LONGSHORENEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' ACT PROCEEDING.
In 1962 Paul Tugwell, a longshoreman, instituted a negligence suit in a
federal district court seeking damages for a back injury he allegedly sustained
while working on a ship owned by the defendant, Klaveness & Co. The ship-
owner impleaded Tugwell's employer, Young & Co., as a third-party defendant.
Klaveness and Co. defended by denying that the injury had occurred at the
time and place in question.: The jury, in answer to a special interrogatory,2
found that no injury had occurred on the date in question. After having lost
his civil suit, Tugwell instituted workmen's compensation proceedings against his
employer under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.3 Young & Co.
moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should be invoked to prohibit the litigation of an issue which had already been
decided in a previous adversary proceeding. The Company argued that the jury's
finding that no injury had occurred on the date in question should estop Tugwell
from attempting to collect for the same alleged injury in the compensation pro-
ceeding. The Commissioner refused to apply collateral estoppel, and found that
Tugwell had sustained a compensable injury on the alleged date. In Young &
Co.'s present suit charging the Commissioner with error in his failure to apply
collateral estoppel, the district court affirmed the Commissioner's award.4 In
agreeing with the district "court, the court of appeals held that the substantial
variance in the standard of proof required to establish facts before the Com-
missioner and the jury precluded the application of collateral estoppel, even
though the issue decided in the two actions was identical. Young & Co. v. Shea,
397 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1968).
The difference in the standard of proof in a subsequent proceeding has, in
limited factual contexts, been considered a sufficient reason for not apply-
ing collateral estoppel. Prior to the instant case, the usual situation where a
variance in the standard of proof has stood as a bar to collateral estoppel has
been where a defendant acquitted in a criminal action has sought to employ the
doctrine to preclude relitigation of an identical issue in a later civil action or
administrative proceeding. Helvering v. Mitchell,5 cited by the court in the
1. Tugwell v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866, 868 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 951 (1964).
2. The exact wording of the interrogatory was: "Did Plaintiff, Paul L. Tugwell, sus-
tain an injury by slipping and falling upon the deck of the M/S Pleasantville during the
early morning hours of July 12, 1958?" Id. at 868 note 1.
3. 33 U. S. C. § 901 et. seq. (1964).
4. Young & Co. v. Shea, No. 65-H-760 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 16, 1966).
5. 303 U. S. 391 (1937).
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instant case,6 clearly illustrates the effect a variance in the standard of proof
may have on the application of the doctrine. In this case, the defendant,
Mitchell, was first indicted for "fraudulently atempt[ing] to .. .evade . ..
[the] income tax."7 The defendant was tried and acquitted on this charge.
Subsequently, an administrative hearing was held before the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to determine whether the defendant had fraudulently deducted
over two million dollars from his gross income. The defendant argued that the
question of fraud, which was necessary to the determination in both proceedings,
had already been resolved in his favor as was shown by the result in the criminal
trial. Therefore, he argued, collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of
this issue in the tax proceeding. The Commissioner did not agree, however, and
levied a penalty8 on the defendant. The Commissioner's decision was affirmed by
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, which held:
The difference in the degree of the burden of proof in criminal and
civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of [collateral estop-
pel].9 The acquittal was "merely . .. an adjudication that the proof
was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused."' 0
In the tax proceeding only a preponderance of the evidence was required to
find the defendant guilty of fraud. A preponderance of the evidence may have
shown the defendant guilty in the criminal action, but this was not enough
evidence to secure a conviction in a proceeding where guilt had to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. From the reasoning in the Mitchell case, the logical
limit of the difference-in-standard-of-proof exception to collateral estoppel can
be ascertained. Only when the criminal action results in an acquittal, will col-
lateral estoppel not be applied." Clearly, if the defendant were found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the same facts would show him guilty by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
Although a variance in the standard of proof between criminal actions and
administrative proceedings has served as the basis for decisions not to apply
collateral estoppel, the same is not true of differences in the standard of proof
between civil actions and administrative proceedings.' 2 In a few decisions which
6. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 189.
7. 303 U. S. at 396.
8. The penalty is considered "remedial" not punitive, so the question of double
jeopardy does not arise. Id. at 404.
9. The Court uses the term res judicata, not collateral estoppel. Courts frequently use
this broader expression instead of the more precise term, even where the causes of action
in the two proceedings are different. Here, the criminal action and the tax proceeding are
different causes of action. In order to avoid confusion, the proper name for the doctrine
has been inserted.
10. 303 U.S. at 397, citing Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302 (1913).
11. See Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
12. There is one recently decided case, however, Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276
F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1967), which has relied on a difference in the standard of proof
between civil actions and administrative proceedings in order to find collateral estoppel
inapplicable. This case is presently on appeal in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
presumably it will be decided in accordance with the decision in the instant case.
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have discussed the effect a prior court finding should have in a later administra-
tive proceeding,' 3 the courts have almost always decided that the finding should
have the same effect it would have in later judicial proceeding.14 In none of
the cases did the court discuss any possible difference in the standard of proof
in the two proceedings which would affect the application of collateral estoppel.
In all likelihood, the reason for the failure of the courts to recognize any
difference in the standard of proof between administrative proceedings and civil
actions stems from a belief that no such difference exists. Most federal ad-
ministrative hearings are held under rules established by the Administrative
Procedure Act.15 The A.P.A. prescribes a standard of proof which is necessary
to sustain a claim in a hearing conducted under the Act. The standard applies
except in hearings where the statute under which the agency operates provides
otherwise.16 This general standard is expressed as follows:
A sanction may not be imposed or a rule or order issued except on
consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence.' 7
Although this section does not, on its face, provide that a finding must be based
on a preponderance of the evidence as in a civil action, the relevant legislative
history of the section seems to indicate that a test similar to a preponderance
of the evidence was intended. The House Judiciary Committee explained the
test in these words:
Where there is evidence pro and con, the agency must weigh it and
decide in accordance with the preponderance. In short, these provisions
require a conscientious and rational judgment on the whole record in
accordance with the proofs deduced.' 8
Courts have probably been correct in not construing the A.P.A. as establishing
a different standard of proof in administrative proceedings held pursuant to
the Act, but as mentioned above, the A.P.A. only applies when the statute under
which the agency operates does not provide otherwise. The instant case arises
13. The court in the instant case discovered only five decisions discussing the problem.
Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 188 note 1. An independent investigation has produced
only one more. See Dixie Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1958).
(Collateral estoppel not applied because of the court's failure to identify its grounds for
decision).
14. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 18.11 (1958). There is at least one
exception to this general trend. Where the statute under which the agency operates has
been interpreted as requiring that the agency be given a "first crack" at resolving a particular
issue, collateral estoppel will not apply. See N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1950), rev'g on other grounds Denver Building Trades Council v. N.L.R.B.,
186 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1950). (A court determination that a labor controversy does not involve
interstate commerce is not binding on the N.L.R.B. in a subsequent proceeding).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. (1964). [Hereinafter referred to as A.P.A.].
16. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1964).
17. Id.
18. Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.
270 (.1944-46).
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under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Therefore, it is necessary
to determine whether this Statute establishes a diffeernt standard of proof which
might affect the applicability of collateral estoppel in proceedings held pursuant
to it.
There exist at least two distinctions in the standard of proof applicable to
claims under the Longshoremen's Act. The first distinction results from a
specific provision of the Act, while the second stems from some courts' view
of the general construction of the Act. As for the statutory provision, section
920(a) provides that
[i] n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation
under this chapter, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary... that the claim comes within the provisions
of this chapter.' 9
The effect of this statutory presumption is to shift the burden of going
forward with the evidence to the employer, 20 and relieve the claimant from
having to prove the facts he would otherwise have to show in order to establish
a prima facie case. Since certain facts are assumed without proof, a difference
in the standard of proof arises when the administrative proceeding is compared
to a civil action. In a civil action, if the plaintiff did not prove the facts sufficient
to establish a prima facie case, a verdict against him would be granted. In the
Longshoremen's Act proceeding, however, the claimant might still win even if
he failed to establish a prima facie case, provided the employer did not affirma-
tively disprove his claim.
It can easily be seen how the statutory presumption could affect the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel. The civil court judgment against the employee
might merely be the result of a finding that because of the presumption he did
not submit sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. As explained above,
this finding would not preclude a compensation award. Therefore, unless the
trial court record clearly shows that the plaintiff lost because the employer
sufficiently disproved his claim, rather than because the plaintiff was unable to
establish a prima facie case, collateral estoppel should not apply. The rules of
the different forums give rise to differences in the standard of proof which
render collateral estoppel inapplicable.
Aside from the statutory presumption, some courts, particularly those in
the District of Columbia,2 ' have developed an independent doctrine that could
lead to the conclusion that the standard of proof in civil actions and Long-
shoremen's Act preceedings is different. The emergence of this doctrine can be
traced to Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris,2 2 decided in 1932, just a few
19. 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1964).
20. See Butler v. District Parking Management Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Donovan, 251 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
But see Nardi v. Willard, 156 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
21. See the cases cited in Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 188. Only one of these
cases was litigated in the Fifth Circuit.
22. 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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years after the Act's passage. In this case the Commissioner denied appellant's
claim for compensation because "it was not proven that the heat stroke from
which decedent died arose out of and in the course of employment."' ' The court
reversed the Commissioner's decision without mention of the statutory presump-
tion. In doing so, the court explained its reason for reversal in the following
manner:
The purpose of all compensation laws is to provide money indemnity
in the case of injury where there is no assignable fault. Accidents in
industry are inevitable, and the enactment of compensation laws grew
out of a general recognition of a duty owed by society to an injured
employee to secure him protection .... Where there is doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of the injured employee or his dependent family.?
(Emphasis added.)
Although there appears to be no reason why the statutory presumption could
not have been used to reach the same result in the Burris case,25 the court's
reasoning is clear. Once it is established that the injury occurred in the employ-
ment setting, any other doubts as to whether the injury was caused by a risk
associated with the employment relationship should be resolved in favor of the
injured employee. The philosophy of the court seems to be that the employer
is covered by insurance, while the employee may not be. Therefore, if mistakes
are made, it is best that the burden of the error fall on the employer who has
less to lose.2 6 Other cases which have adopted the Burris court's interpretation
of the Statute that doubtful questions be resolved in favor of the injured em-
ployee, have involved questions similar to the one in the Burris case. Most
typically, the doctrine has been invoked when competent expert testimony
conflicts on complex medical questions. With the Commissioner unable to resolve
the issue by finding that one presentation is more correct than the other, the
question has been resolved in favor of the injured employee.27 It is significant
to note that although the "doubtful questions rule"--as the principle in the
Burris case may be referred to-has evolved separately from the statutory
presumption, its operation appears to be substantially similar. Cases can be
found where the presumption and the rule are both mentioned, with no attempt
to distinguish the two.28
The effect that application of the "doubtful questions rule" would have on
collateral estoppel is similar to the effect of the presumption as can be seen by
examining the result in the instant case. Before this result is examined, however,
it is first necessary to mention some of the preliminary issues with which the
23. Id. at 1043.
24. Id. at 1044.
25. Perhaps the parties did not bring the presumption into the argument presented
before the court.
26. See F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Lowe, 145 F.2d 886,888. (2d Cir. 1944).
27. See, e.g., J. V. Vozzolo, Inc. v. Britton, 377 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Doubtful
questions rule" applied to question of whether myocardial infarct was a consequence of
an employment related accident).
28. Id.
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court was forced to deal. First, in his argument that collateral estoppel did not
apply, the Commissioner maintained there was no identity of issues in the
two proceedings as would be necessary for the imposition of collateral estoppel,
because the civil action was based on negligence, whereas the compensation
remedy was a form of insurance.2 9 The court reasoned in answering this con-
tention that in order for collateral estoppel to apply "it was only necessary to
show that the same fact question was clearly decided in the prior suit.., and
that the issue was material to ... [the suit's] ... determination."30 The special
interrogatory employed in the court action was intended to answer the question
of whether the injury had occurred when alleged. Since occurrence of the injury
at the place and time in question was the precise issue which had to be proved
at the compensation proceeding, the court had no problem in finding an identity
of issues in the two actions. Since there was no claim that any other element
necessary for collateral estoppel was lacking,31 the court next considered whether
any special features of the administrative proceeding existed which would pro-
hibit the application of the doctrine.
In comparing civil actions and Longshoremen's Act proceedings, the court
first noted that the Commissioner was not bound by the common law rules of
evidence. The court termed the proceedings before the Commissioner as, there-
fore, more "free-wheeling." 32 The Commissioner could accept hearsay evidence
and other documents which would be inadmissible in a court of law.
The court found of even greater significance, however, that in proceedings
under the Longshoremen's Act "in considering the proof offered by the parties,
the Commissioner operates under the statutory policy that all doubtful fact
questions are to be resolved in favor of the injured employee."3 3 This paramount
difference between the court and administrative proceeding led to the court's
conclusion that "a substantial variance in the burden of proof" 4 existed in the
two proceedings and that a substantial variance of this nature "ha[d] precluded
application of collateral estoppel in other situations." 35 The court buttressed its
analysis by making an analogy to the degree-of-proof exception to collateral
estoppel in criminal and civil proceedings. 36 Since a criminal acquittal would
not bar an action by the same plaintiff in a subsequent civil proceeding because
29. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at ,187.
30. Id., citing Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262,264 (5th Cir. 1964); Hyman v.
Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1958).
31. The court did not consider whether the proper parties for collateral estoppel were
present, although the district court decision had been based on a finding that the parties
to the present suit were not adverse parties in the previous court action. Young & Co. v.
Shea, No. 65-H-760 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 16, 1966). The fact that the court did not discuss
this lower court holding is not surprising. Both parties probably realized the decision was
in error. A third-party defendant and the plaintiff certainly are adverse parties, since if the
plaintiff wins, the third-party defendant might be liable to the defendant. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 14(a).




36. Id. at 189.
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the degree of proof necessary for a judgment was less in the civil case, a verdict
for the defendant in a civil action should not bar a plaintiff's claim in a sub-
sequent administrative proceeding where the degree of proof was less. 37 This
analogy served as the stepping-stone to the court's conclusion:
[S]ince we are persuaded that the applicable legal rules enable a
claimant to establish the existence of an actionable injury before the
Commissioner more easily than in a civil tort action,... on the facts of
this case the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable.38
The court in the instant case, relying heavily on the "doubtful questions
rule" as establishing a different standard of proof for the administrative pro-
ceeding, found that collateral estoppel was inapplicable. The court did not con-
sider, however, whether the "doubtful questions rule" has applied, or should
apply, to the particular type of issue involved in the case. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in the original negligence action helps to cast light
on the exact issue involved in the present proceeding.39 A reading of that opinion
clearly shows the court's belief that Tugwell lost simply because the jury did
not believe his story that the injury occurred while he was working on the
ship.40 The issue involved was one of credibility: Tugwell claimed he slipped
and fell, while the shipowner attempted to show that Tugwell had sustained
the injury somewhere else at another time.41 At the administrative hearing,
the Commissioner was faced with having to resolve the same issue. The court,
by deciding that the "doubtful questions rule" applies to the Commissioner's
decision, in effect holds that the "doubtful questions rule" applies to the issue
of the claimant's own credibility. It is interesting to speculate whether the
court meant to reach this result. The "doubtful questions rule" has never be-
fore been applied in cases where the claimant's credibility has been the critical
factor. As already mentioned, the usual situation for the invocation of the rule
has been where competent medical testimony conflicts on complex issues. 42 In
such situations, the question is not whether the experts are telling the truth,
but rather which presentation is more correct. Perhaps the court should have
discussed whether the rule should extend to this new situation. The court ac-
cepted the fact that the presumption did not apply to the issue of the claim-
ant's credibility,43 but no reason is offered as to why the "doubtful questions
rule" should then apply. It is one thing to imply-as did the court in the Burris
case-that when an injury is indisputably shown to have happened on the job,
the employee should have the benefit of the doubt with regard to whether the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Tugwell v. AYF. Kiaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1963), cert denied,
376 U.S. 951 (1964).
40. Id. at 868.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 188, citing Sykes v. O'Hearne, 181 F. Supp. 368,
371 (D. Md. 1960).
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injury is sufficiently related to a risk arising out of the employment. 44 It is
quite another thing to hold that the employee should have the same benefit
when the issue is whether to believe him in his claim that the injury occurred
while he was at work.
Rather than relying on the "doubtful questions rule" and expanding the
rule to encompass the claimant's credibility, the court could have rested its
holding on a different ground. The court noted that the proceedings before the
Commissioner were more "free-wheeling" and that the Commissioner was not
bound by the common law rules of evidence.45 This fact alone might have a
crucial impact on whether collateral estoppel ought to be applicable to the
administrative proceeding. Suppose, for example, that although the jury did not
believe Tugwell's evidence, his story could have been corraborated by hearsay
or other evidence which would have been inadmissable in a court of law. The
administrator would be able to give such testimony its probative weight, and
with fair weight given to this testimony, Tugwell's credibility might have been
shored up enough to convince the Commissioner the story was true. Therefore,
under the rules applicable to the administrative proceeding, Tugwell might have
won. Thus, the court could have held that collateral estoppel should not apply
where the differences in the rules of evidence in the two forums create a strong
possibility of. a different result. The situation is analogous to cases where a
change in substantive law has occurred between the first and second proceeding
in the same forum. In such cases collateral estoppel has been held to be inap-
propriate,46 and there is no apparent reason why collateral estoppel could not
be held to be inappropriate in the instant case for similar reasons. Fairness
would appear to require that the claimant be allowed to take advantage of the
less strict rules where a significantly different result might occur in the ad-
ministrative proceeding.
Regardless of the grounds for the holding, the instant case may prove
important in the administration of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act. Negligence actions against shipowners with employers as third-party de-
fendants occur with some frequency, since the Act expressly allows the em-
ployee to sue the shipowner without regard to a compensation claim being filed
against the employer.47 As a result of the instant case, an employer will not
automatically be free from workmen's compensation liability if the employee
loses the negligence action, even if the employer has the foresight to set the
stage for collateral estoppel by asking the jury to answer a special interrogatory
involving the occurrence of the injury.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that the "doubtful questions
rule," on which the court relied so heavily, is a peculiarity of the Act as in-
44. 59 F.2d '1042, 1044.
45. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 188.
46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964).
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terpreted by some courts only. 8 It remains to be seen whether other courts,
who .have not relied on the "doubtful questions rule," will follow the result in
Young & Co. Without the adoption of the "doubtful questions rule" it may
seem unlikely that the decision will be followed. Courts could follow the instant
case, however, by holding that the statutory presumption, rather than the
"doubtful questions rule," creates a different standard of proof which precludes
application of the doctrine.49 In the instant case the court did not consider
whether the presumption would give rise to a different standard of proof, be-
cause the court decided that the presumption did not apply to the particular
question involved. 50 Other courts might hold that the presumption did apply
to the particular question involved, and it would be possible to use the pre-
sumption as the basis for a decision not to apply collateral estoppel because
of a difference in the standard of proof.
The court's short discussion of the relaxed rules of evidence in the ad-
ministrative proceeding as a possible factor in its decision not to apply collateral
estoppel, may prove to be of more general significance in administrative law
than the discussion of the difference in standard of proof arising from the pur-
pose and provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. All administrative agencies
operate under relaxed rules of evidence.5 In future cases involving other
agencies, it may be argued that the difference in the rules of evidence alone is
a sufficient reason not to apply collateral estoppel. Although the instant case
does not hold that the difference in the rules of evidence would be a sufficient
reason not to apply the doctrine, this possibility is in no way precluded by the
court's opinion. In any event, the instant case indicates that in the future the
applicability of collateral estoppel to administrative proceedings may depend
to a greater extent than has previously been recognized in the past, on the
particular function and rules of each agency. In this respect, Young & Co. v.
Shea may well be regarded as the basis for a new approach to the question of
the effect to be given prior court judgments in subsequent administrative pro-
ceedings.
DAVID E. MANcH
48. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
50. Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d at 188.
51. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (d) (1966).
